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SENTENCING DISCRETION IN PENNSYLVANIA: HAS THE
PENDULUM RETURNED TO THE TRIAL JUDGE?
The Honorable John C. Dowling*
When one thinks of the criminal justice system as a responsive
mechanism, one is immediately confronted with at least four, some-
times competing goals-retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and
incapacitation.' These four goals of criminal justice have been so
well-established and so often cited as reasons for imposing criminal
sanctions that it seems, at this late date, beyond cavil to quarrel with
their philosophical underpinnings. But when one considers that each
of these objectives weighs more or less heavily in the minds of a
vast body of trial judges, in a sentencing scheme that permits-and
in fact requires 2-consideration of numerous factors relating to these
ends in arriving at a single sentence, it is not surprising that sharp
differences in sentencing practices emerge.' It was for this reason,
i.e., disparity in sentencing, that proponents of sentencing reform
advocated limits on discretionary sentencing power.
4
In the Keystone State, those efforts culminated in the creation in
1976 of the Pennsylvania Commission On Sentencing which was
charged with the responsibility, generally stated, "of collecting data
regarding sentencing practices throughout the Commonwealth and
assimilating a wide range of information and opinions from indivi-
* Judge of the Court of Common Pleas Twelfth Judicial District, 1970.
B.S., 1948, University of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1950, Dickinson School of Law. The
author wishes to acknowledge the services of Shawn P. Kenny, his law clerk, for
his research and assistance in preparing this article.
1. Gottfredson, Criminal Sentencing in Transition, 68 JUDICATURE 125 (1984);
Carey, Foreward: Sentencing Provisions and Considerations in the Federal System,
13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 609-619 (1982).
2. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9721-9726 (Purdon 1982); 204 PA. ADMIN.
CODE § 303 (Shepard's 1988).
3. See Knapp, What Sentencing Reform in Minnesota has and has not
Accomplished, 68 JUDICATURE 181, 185 (1984) ("The simultaneous pursuit of mul-
tiple goals in a single sentence .. . results in maximum discretion for decision-
makers.")
4. Martin, Interests and Politics In Sentencing Reform: The Development
of Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and Pennsylvania, 29 ViiL. L. REV. 21, 22-
23 (1983-84).
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duals and groups interested in the sentencing process either person-
ally, professionally or otherwise." 5 The objective "was to enable the
Commission to promulgate guidelines to be considered by courts in
imposing sentences and, if appropriate, to propose to the legislature
changes in the sentencing statutes." ' 6 Sentencing guidelines eventually
were enacted into law and became effective July 22, 1982. These so-
called guidelines7 came to be a permanent fixture on the landscape
of Pennsylvania criminal law until the State Supreme Court's decision
in Commonwealth v. Sessoms.8 In Sessoms, the court held that the
guidelines were invalid because the legislature acted unconstitutionally
when it failed to present to the governor a concurrent resolution of
the respective Houses of the General Assetnbly which had rejected
the first set of guidelines submitted to it in 1981. In other words,
the first set and all subsequent amendments thereto, were invalid
because of a failure to meet constitutionally mandated procedural
requirements. As a matter of substantive constitutional law, however,
the concept of commission-established guidelines was deemed consti-
tutional provided the guidelines "do not exceed the constitutional
limitations applicable to the legislature generally. 9
The respite from the constraints of the guidelines was brief. 10 For
whatever one's views, the legislature acted quickly in re-enacting and
5. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, , 532 A.2d 775, 776 (1987).
6. Id. For a detailed discussion of the political process leading to the final
enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines, 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303 (Shepard's
1988), see Martin, supra note 4.
7. See and compare Commonwealth v. Smith, 340 Pa. Super. 62, 85, 489
A.2d 845, 852 (1985) (Cirillo, J., dissenting: "It is my opinion that the Code
Guidelines are guidelines, and nothing more.") with Commonwealth v. Hutchinson,
343 Pa. Super. 596, 598, 495 A.2d 956, 958 (1985) ("In sum, only in exceptional
cases and for sufficient reasons may a court deviate from the guidelines.")
8. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775.
9. Id. at -, 532 A.2d at 782. The court explained, "We recognize that
guidelines adopted under this scheme have significantly less force than is commonly
attributed to them, but this result is necessary and unavoidable if the Commission
as structured under present legislation is to pass constitutional muster." Id. at
__, 532 A.2d at 782. The concern over structure was borne out by the observation
that "inclusion of legislators and/or judges [four each] on an agency administering
the laws is itself likely violative of the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at
-_ 532 A.2d at 780. In order to avoid this constitutional pitfall, the court, in
accordance with 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(3) (presumption that the legislature
acts constitutionally) interpreted the Commission as having the power to investigate,
classify and evaluate, but whose product-the guidelines-lacked the force and effect
of law. Id. Employing the same reasoning and general due process principles, the
new federal sentencing guidelines have been recently declared unconstitutional in
United States v. Frank, F. Supp. (W.D. Pa., Mar. 30, 1988).
10. Indeed, even during the period of the guidelines' invalidity, the appellate
926 [Vol. 26:925
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revising them.1" Thus, it is apparent that guidelines are here to stay.
On April 25, 1988 the trial judges of Pennsylvania are once again
shackled by the constraints that the guidelines purport to place on
sentencing discretion. This article will seek to demonstrate that, at
least pre-Sessoms, 2 and despite the compelling euphemism and the
soothing language of some appellate decisions, the guidelines have
acquired the force of mandates which the sentencing judge deviates
from at his peril and where in explaining his non-compliance he
needs the elegance of Holmes, the wit of Musmanno, and the
profundity of Blackstone, if he is to satisfy his appellate brethren.
As a result, the joy of some, 3 and the fear of others,14 was fulfilled-
a "common law" of punishment has grown out of successive appel-
late decisions which have "come to govern sentencing more than the
guidelines."' 5 Secondly, it will be argued that recent Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decisions have sounded, and wisely so, the death
knell to intense appellate review of trial court sentencing discretion.
Finally, as a member of the bench for eighteen years, I will add my
own observations on sentencing and will attempt to counter some of
the arguments in favor of increased appellate review of sentencing
decisions.
A brief historical review of sentencing practice is in order. As a
trial judge, I agree with the statement of Chief Justice (then Justice)
Nix who said that sentencing is the "most complex and difficult
function a jurist is called upon to perform.' ' 6 For centuries, however,
courts were still using them to evaluate the reasonableness of a sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Douglass, - Pa. Super. -, , 535 A.2d 1172, 1173
(1988); Commonwealth v. Pickering, - Pa. Super .... 533 A.2d 735,
739 n.l (1987).
11. Some of the revisions include increased offense gravity scores for aggra-
vated assault and statutory rape, which were made to correspond with increases in
the statutory grades of these offenses pursuant to Act 164 of 1986. A new guidelines
chart was devised and applies exclusively to all violations of the Controlled Substance,
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq. Further, the court is
directed that it "should consider" an explicit list of circumstances when determining
whether a disposition will be imposed in the aggravated or mitigated range for drug
offenses under Title 35.204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.3 (Shepard's 1988).
12. See supra note 5.
13. See Levin, Maryland's Sentencing Guidelines-A System By and For
Judges, 68 JUDICATURE 172, 179 (1984).
14. Schwartz, Options In Constructing A Sentencing System: Sentencing
Guidelines Under Legislative or Judicial Hegemony, 67 VA. L. REV. 637, 665 (May
1981).
15. Id.
16. Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 136, 351 A.2d 650, 659 (1976)
(Nix, J., dissenting). See also Robinson, A Sentencing System For the 21st Century?,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1987).
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the decision had been relatively simple because there was only one
punishment for all crimes.' 7 The sentence of death was mandatory;
judicial discretion was not an issue. 8 Clearly, the basic purpose of
sentencing under such a scheme was retribution. 9
Not surprisingly, the payment of human life for the theft of a
horse was deemed too austere.2 0 As early as 1790, the use of incar-
ceration as punishment was accepted2 l and gradually became the
primary modality by the nineteenth century. 22 Though death was not
used as punishment save for the most serious offenses, the dominant
purpose of sentencing was still retributive.
23
During the late 1800's and early 1900's, legislatures began to re-
evaluate their sentencing philosophy in light of the more humane
and scientific theory of rehabilitation. The counterpart to this phi-
losophy is the indeterminate sentence law, which was enacted in
Pennsylvania in 1911.24 Within the statutory limits prescribed for the
offense, the court had discretion to impose a sentence that it deemed
appropriate. In determining what sentence was appropriate, the court
was thereby empowered to consider and weigh not only the crime at
hand, but also the defendant's character and background. Thus, the
concept of "individual sentencing ' 2 5 was introduced and has re-
mained a part of Pennsylvania criminal law.
Individualized sentencing necessitates the granting of broad discre-
tion in those of us trusted with the awesome power to decide.2 6 For
17. Martin, 466 Pa. at 128, 351 A.2d at 655.
18. Comment, Procedural and Substantive Fairness in Sentencing: An Un-
necessarily Unappealing Subject to Pennsylvania Higher Courts, 82 DICK. L. REV.
379, 380 n.14 (1978).
19. Dowd, The Pit and The Pendulum: Correctional Law Reform From the
Sixties Into The Eighties, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983-84).
20. Comment, supra note 18.
21. Dowd, supra note 19, at 3 n.7.
22. Martin, 466 Pa. at 128, 351 A.2d at 655.
23. Forst, Selective Incapacitation: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 68 JuDI-
CATTRE 153 (1984). The retributive theory, i.e., that "punishment should be directly
proportional to the crime committed" became a popular theory since it was first
posited by Cesare di Beccaria in the eighteenth century. Dowd, supra note 19, at 3
n.6.
24. The Act of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1055 § 6, as amended, 19 P.S. § 1057
(1964), provided in pertinent part: " . . . the court, instead of pronouncing upon
such convict a definite or fixed term of imprisonment, shall pronounce .. . a
sentence of imprisonment for an indefinite term: Stating in such sentence the
minimum and maximum limits thereof; and the maximum limit shall never exceed
the maximum time now or hereafter prescribed as a penalty for such offense. . ....




years, appellate courts "have long recognized the wisdom in vesting
this responsibility within the discretion of the trial judge and [they]
have been loathe to interfere except where there has been a clearly
demonstrated abuse of that discretion." 2 7 A consequence of the broad
discretion is that two individuals who commit similar or identical
crimes may legally receive different sentences. Because of this per-
ceived inequity, reform efforts focused on ways to limit trial court
discretion.
The first, and perhaps easiest, route taken to promote uniformity
was to assure that the process by which the judge arrived at his or
her decision was a fair one.2 8 The reception by the court of adequate
and accurate information was deemed crucial to fashioning a sentence
consistent with the Commonwealth's sentencing philosophy. 29 A log-
ical corollary to the requirement that the court consider information
bearing on the defendant's character and background, in addition to
pre-sentence reports,30 is the requirement that judges state on the
record their reasons for the sentence imposed. 1 This requirement,
though landmark3 2 at the time, is now so deep-rooted in the minds
of trial judges that when imposing a sentence, it is often reduced to
a mere mechanical incantation of statutory principles.3
27. Id. at 136, 351 A.2d at 659.
28. The notion of "procedural fairness" in arriving at a sentence reflects the
concern that the decision be based upon an informed exercise of discretion and is
derived principally from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Comment, supra note 18, at 384-385.
29. Martin, 466 Pa. at 131-33, 351 A.2d at 657. A sentencing policy was
formally enacted on December 30, 1974 and provided in pertinent part: ". . .the
court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed shall call for the
minimum amount of confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public,
the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 18 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1321(b).
This section was repealed and has been incorporated, with what I believe are
significant changes, in Title 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721(b), as follows: " . . .
the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection
of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of
the victim and on the community and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The
court shall also consider any guidelines for sentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing. .. ."
30. PA. R. CRm. P., Rule 1403, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. authorizes the
use of pre-sentence reports as well as psychiatric or diagnostic examinations.
31. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977).
32. Though Riggins was the first decision which explicitly required a statement
of reasons in all cases, as early as 1932, the court in Commonwealth v. Garramone,
307 Pa. 507, 514, 161 A. 733, 735 (1932), required "a brief memorandum which
will reveal the reasons for the sentence imposed" in cases where the death penalty
is imposed following a plea to murder.
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bryner, 385 Pa. Super. 305, 308, 427 A.2d
19881
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The procedural safeguards which were designed to insure individ-
ualized treatment of offenders obviously did little to promote uni-
formity. Indeed, individualization is the antithesis of uniformity. This
brings us to the guidelines, which are an attempt to bring about
substantive fairness in the penalties imposed. Prior to the guidelines,
however, the issue of substantive fairness was limited to the question
of whether the sentence "exceeds the statutorily prescribed limits or
is so manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment.
'3 4
Thus, the guidelines can be seen not only as an attempt to promote
uniformity, but also to expand a previously and "deliberately cur-
tailed scope of appellate review in this area."35 Unfortunately, sen-
tencing appeals under the guidelines have become an area wrought
with difficulty and have been the subject of much tension between
the trial and appellate courts. The problem was prophetically fore-
warned by Chief Justice, then Justice, Nix in Commonwealth v.
Martin,3 6 who feared that "the majority opinion introduces a concept
of appellate review that would permit an appellate tribunal to su-
perimpose its sentencing philosophy upon the sentencing court. I
believe this intrusion upon the trial court's sentencing discretion is
unwarranted and therefore register my dissent." 3 7 Though Martin
was decided six years before the guidelines came into effect, this
decision, along with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Riggins3 8 marked a clear shift in the degree of
discretionary power once accorded trial courts.39
This change in attitude has been seized upon to the extent that the
guidelines became the all-important overriding factor in sentencing.
The result has been that the appellate courts have often reversed the
trial court under the guise of a "fail[urel to articulate properly the
reasons for its sentence" n which in reality is often a disagreement
236, 237 (1981) and Commonwealth v. Wicks, 265 Pa. Super. 305, 401 A.2d 1223
(1979).
34. Martin, 466 Pa. at 137, 351 A.2d at 660 (Nix, J., dissenting, quoting
Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 206, 275 A.2d 78, 80-81 (1971)).
35. Martin, 466 Pa. at 136, 351 A.2d at 660.
36. Id. at 118, 351 A.2d 650.
37. Id. at 138, 351 A.2d at 660.
38. Riggins, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Pa. 550, 551, 317 A.2d 250, 251
(1974) (per curiam: "The sentence imposed upon a convicted person is within the
sole discretion of the sentencing judge, and will be reviewed by an appellate court
only within narrow confines.")




as to the "weight to be attached to the germane variables in the
sentencing decision, ' 4' and ultimately, disagreement with the sentence
imposed.
Consider Commonwealth v. McDonald,42 in which a jury convicted
the defendant of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, bur-
glary and simple assault and was sentenced to serve three concurrent
terms of imprisonment of three to six years and a concurrent one-
to two-year term for the assault. The total sentence of three-to six-
years was obviously well below the statutory maximum of thirty-one
to sixty-two years for all four offenses if imposed consecutively. 43
The court heard arguments of counsel and had this to say before
imposing the sentence:
THE COURT: Mr. McDonald, I have considered your past arrest
history. I have considered your good behavior at the ... Prison.
These are points in your favor, but I have also considered the seri-
ousness of these offenses, and the fact that you were found guilty by
a jury after a full trial. I have also considered the need of the protection
of the public from this type of offenses [sic] and in addition I have
considered the circumstances involved such as the use of violent force
in this case and the trauma or effect it has on the victim. In determining
your rehabilitative needs I have considered the alternatives in sentenc-
ing .... The Court finds that any lesser sentence than that could be
imposed would depreciate the seriousness of the crimes involved and
that you are definitely in need of correctional treatment that can best
be provided in a state institution.44
The Superior Court, in a two to one decision, held that the
statement of reasons "fall[s] short of complying with the dictates of
Commonwealth v. Riggins . . . .. ,4 The references made by the trial
court to defendant's good behavior and past arrest record "were not
sufficiently detailed." '46 Further, defense counsel's arguments were
deemed not a substitute for a statement of reasons.
4
1
41. Martin, 466 Pa. at 138, 351 A.2d at 660 (Nix, J., dissenting).
42. McDonald, supra note 40.
43. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2701, 3121, 3123, and 3502 (Purdon 1983).
44. McDonald, 322 Pa. Super. at 114, 469 A.2d at 207-08.
45. McDonald, 322 Pa. Super. at 114-115, 469 A.2d at 208.
46. Id.
47. But see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 319 Pa. Super. 635, 466 A.2d 728
(1983). In the unpublished memorandum opinion Commonwealth v. Johnson, No.
110, slip op. at 6 (Harrisburg 1983), in which a sentence of five to twelve years
imprisonment for violations of the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 780-113(f)(1) (Purdon 1987), was upheld on the ground that the
sentence was within the statutory maximums and because I "was afforded the benefit
of the extensive remarks of counsel for appellant and the Commonwealth."
19881
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Another example is Commonwealth v. Smith48 in which the defen-
dant plead guilty to robbery, aggravated assault and disorderly con-
duct and received five to ten years imprisonment for the robbery;
six to twelve months consecutive on the assault, and a concurrent
term of probation of ten years. The trial court refused to change the
sentence after defense counsel made an oral motion to modify on
the basis that the guidelines recommended for the robbery an aggra-
vated minimum sentence range of twelve to eighteen months. The
victim of the robbery, a cashier at a convenience store, was struck
on the face and neck and as a result sustained serious injuries which
required extensive medical attention. Although the majority opinion
does not indicate the full extent of the trial court's reasons, the
dissent reveals that "the judge took note of the defendant's violent
tendencies as evidenced by his juvenile record, military record, and
the way he wantonly inflicted harm after he had already completed
a robbery. ' 49 Nevertheless, the majority remanded for re-sentencing
because the "court [itself] did not advise the defendant what the
sentencing guidelines provided as far as the range of sentence and
did not state why he deviated from the sentencing guidelines. . . .",0
The statement of reasons must demonstrate "at least in a summary
form, the factual basis and specific reasons which compelled the
court to deviate from the sentencing range." 5
More examples, which demonstrate that the guidelines have ac-
quired the force of mandates through appellate enforcement, could
be cited. Fortunately, however, two recent Pennsylvania Superior
Court cases buttress the argument most effectively without the need
to belabor the point further. In Commonwealth v. Bullicki12 the
defendant was convicted of attempted burglary and was sentenced to
serve eight to twenty-three and one-half months imprisonment fol-
lowed by eight years probation, a sentence seventeen months below
the guideline range. 3 As in McDonald,14 the dissent in Bullicki offers
a more fair-minded and complete statement of the trial. court's
reasons:
48. 340 Pa. Super. 72, 489 A.2d 845 (1985).
49. Id. at 86, 489 A.2d at 852-853 (Cirillo, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 84, 489 A.2d at 851-852 (quoting Commonwealth v. Royer, 328
Pa. Super. 60, 71, 476 A.2d 453, 458 (1984)).
51. Id. at 83, 489 A.2d at 851 (quoting Commonwealth v. Royer, supra note
50.
52. 355 Pa. Super. 416, 513 A.2d 990 (1986).
53. Id. at 417, 513 A.2d at 990.
54. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26:925
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The sentencing court noted that although the record was sufficient to
support an attempted burglary conviction, the facts could also have
led to the conclusion that appellant was being a "peeping tom" on
the occasion in question. [The court was aware that the defendant had
a history of being a peeping tom.] The court felt that the facts and
circumstances of the offense "were not of such a serious nature as to
warrant further incarceration." The court obviously imposed a sentence
which it believed was consistent with the protection of the public and
the gravity of the offense as related to the impact on the victim and
the community, after taking into account the guidelines."
.In a rare display of candor, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
remanded for sentencing specifically to be imposed "within the range
of the guidelines." 5 6 The majority's decision to remand was premised
primarily on a statement by the sentencing judge to the effect that
the defendant was facing additional incarceration because of parole
violations and because the sentencing judge commented after impos-
ing sentence that he "would take a dim view to any further criminal
activity for any reason whatsoever." 57 It appears that the majority
seized upon these comments to the exclusion of all other reasons in
an attempt to justify its result. What is most troubling is that the
trial court was directed to specifically impose a sentence within the
guidelines.
In the second case, Commonwealth v. Radabaugh," the trial judge
had twice sentenced the defendant to serve a term of two and one-
half to five years for Possession and Possession with Intent to Deliver
Methamphetamines. The trial court's reasons were that it felt the
guidelines were too lenient for drug offenses, that the defendant had
been manufacturing the drug, that incarceration was needed to illus-
trate the seriousness of the crime, to deter others in the community
and to meet the defendant's rehabilitative needs.5 9 On the second
appeal, the superior court remanded for sentencing "specifically to
be imposed within the minimum or mitigated minimum range of the
sentencing guidelines,"0 despite the potential statutory maximum of
fifteen years 61 and a recognition by the Sentencing Commission itself
55. Bullicki, 355 Pa. Super. at 421, 513 A.2d at 992 (Brosky, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 420, 513 A.2d at 992.
57. Id.
58. Unpublished memorandum opinion. No. 88, slip op. at 5 n.5 (Harrisburg,
1987).
59. Id. at 2-3.
60. Id. at 5.
61. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 780-113(0(1). Reference to statutory maxi-
mums is not an uncommon way to gloss over the apparent severity of an otherwise
19881
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that "major drug trafficking" may warrant a more severe sentence
than suggested under the guidelines.
62
In short, Pennsylvania appellate courts, particularly the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court, have developed a "common-law ' 63 of sen-
tencing which was best summed-up in Commonwealth v. Hutchinson,
64
wherein the court wrote "only in exceptional cases and for sufficient
reasons may a court deviate from the guidelines, ' 65 despite the
absence of this language in the sentencing code. As a result, the
burden was placed on the trial court to justify a sentence outside of
the guidelines. Fortunately, two recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
cases have signaled an end to this practice and hopefully a return to
the "abuse of discretion" standard of review.
66
One case, Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki,67 dealt with the proce-
dures which must be followed by a party seeking review of the
discretionary aspects of a sentence. Ordinarily, a criminal defendant
had a right to appeal the judgment of sentence to the superior court;
however, under the new sentencing code, either party may challenge
the discretionary aspect of the sentence, but must first invoke the
jurisdiction68 of the appellate court by demonstrating "that there is
a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate
under this chapter." ' 69 In order to implement this law, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, pursuant to its rule making power, promul-
gated specific rules regarding the manner in which a party is to
harsh sentence under the guidelines. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 319 Pa.
Super. 635, 466 A.2d 728 (1983), unpublished memorandum opinion, No. 110, slip.
op. at 5 n.2. (Harrisburg, 1982); Commonwealth v. Muller, 364 Pa. Super. 346,
352, 528 A.2d 191, 194 (1987) ("In the instant case, the sentence imposed was
rigorous but well within the statutory limits and guidelines."); and see Common-
wealth v. Williams, 456 Pa. 550, 552, 317 A.2d 250, 251-252 (1974).
62. 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.1(e) (Shepard's 1988).
63. Levin, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
64. 343 Pa. Super. 596, 495 A.2d 956 (1985).
65. Id. at 599, 495 A.2d at 958.
66. See Commonwealth v. Douglass, -, Pa. Super ... 535 A.2d
1172, 1173 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17
(1987).
67. 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987).
68. Commonwealth v. Cummings, - Pa. Super. -, 534 A.2d 114
(1987). The reader is cautioned that the use of the word "jurisdiction" may not be
accurate. In Commonwealth v. Krum, __ Pa. Super. -, 533 A.2d 134 (1987),
the superior court ruled 5-4 that the requirements of PA. R. App. P. 2119 (f) and
Tuladziecki (see accompanying text) are procedural, rather than jurisdictional, and
thus a failure to object to an appellant's failure to include a "concise statement"
in his or her brief results in a waiver of that issue.
69. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(b) (Purdon 1983).
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demonstrate a substantial question. 70 Specifically, PA. R. App. P.
2116(b) requires a party to include:
any questions relating to the discretionary aspects of the sentence
imposed (but not the issue whether the appellate court should exercise
its discretion to reach such question) in the statement [of questions
involved] required by Subdivision (a). Failure to comply with this
subdivision shall constitute a waiver of all issues relating to the
discretionary aspects of sentence.
PA. R. App. P. 2119(f) further requires an appellant challenging
the discretionary aspects to "set forth in his brief a concise statement
of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. . . . The statement
shall immediately precede the argument on the merits with respect
to the discretionary aspects of sentence."
In Tuladziecki, the Commonwealth appealed the discretionary as-
pects of a sentence to the superior court, which reversed and re-
manded for resentencing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated
the superior court's order because the Commonwealth's brief did not
have the required "concise statement." Prior to this ruling, superior
court had routinely reviewed the briefs and argument on the merits
in order to determine if there was a substantial question.7  This, the
court wrote, was error:
Superior Court may not, however, be permitted to rely on its assess-
ment of the argument on the merits of the issue to justify post hoc a
determination that a substantial question exists. If this determination
is not made prior to examination of and ruling on the merits of the
issue of the appropriateness of the sentence, the Commonwealth has
in effect obtained an appeal as of right from the discretionary aspects
of a sentence.
72
Though Tuladziecki and its progeny may seem far afield from the
instant topic, given that it concerns very technical procedural require-
ments for obtaining review of a sentence, the following passage
reveals the import of the court's decision:
Our insistence on separate presentation of these issues is more than
mere formalism; important concerns of substance guide this decision.
In addition to preserving the respective rights of both parties according
to the jurisdictional scheme provided by the legislature, it furthers the
purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any
challenges to the trial court's evaluation of the multitude of factors
70. See PA. R. App. P. 902, 2116(b) and 2119(f).
71. Commonwealth v. Zeitlen, 366 Pa. Super. 78, 530 A.2d 900, 901 (1987).
72. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. at 513, 522 A.2d at 19.
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impinging on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.71 (emphasis
added).
The court went on to note some of the general principles found
in the Sentencing Code74 which must be considered by the trial court
before pronouncing sentence and concluded:
It is apparent that the legislature has vested broad discretion in the
trial court to impose a sentence appropriate to each case which comes
before it .... It is only where a party can articulate reasons why a
particular sentence raises doubts that this scheme as a whole has been
compromised that the appellate court should review the manner in
which the trial court exercised its discretion.
7"
A fair reading of Tuladziecki buttresses the conclusion that the
supreme court went out of its way to restore sentencing discretion
in the trial court and to reject cases such as Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson76 which essentially say that a sentencing judge deviates
from the guidelines at his or her peril. Continuing this restoration
of sentencing power is Commonwealth v. Sessoms,7 7 which, as dis-
cussed above, declared the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines un-
constitutional for reasons unrelated to their substantive effect.
However, a concern over their effect, i.e., the weight to be accorded
them, was indeed expressed due to the inclusion of legislators and
judges on the Sentencing Commission.7 1 In order to avoid a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine, the court held that the "guide-
lines cannot, without more, be given the effect of law, either as
legislation or regulation, so as to by themselves alter the legal rights
and duties" of the parties or the court. 79 The decision further states
that the trial court "has no 'duty' to impose a sentence considered
appropriate by the Commission" 80 and that the court need only "take
notice of the Commission's work."'" That the guidelines are truly
"guidelines, and nothing more '8 2 is derived not only by the express
language used, but also by constitutional limitations inherent in the
composition of the commission.
73. Id. at 513, 522 A.2d at 19-20.
74. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9701 et seq. (Purdon 1983).
75. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. at 515, 522 A.2d at 20.
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. Sessoms, 516 Pa. at _ , 532 A.2d at 780.
80. Id. at -, 532 A.2d at 781.
81. Id.




It should be noted that a criminal defendant previously had nothing
to lose and everything to gain by appealing the terms of a sentence.
In fact, it was not uncommon for defendants to appeal sentences
within the guidelines. To stem this flow of appeals and to preserve
judicial resources for cases involving genuine abuses of discretion,
the court has stated unequivocally that challenges shall be limited to
"exceptional cases." 83 If Tuladziecki and Sessoms mean what they
say, sentencing discretion has returned to the trial judge, who will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. The question remaining
is whether an abuse of discretion standard is sound as a jurispru-
dential matter, and whether we trial judges, as trustees of sentencing
power, are worthy of our charge, in a system that demands fairness
above all else, but whose participants disagree as to what is fair.
It is important to point out that the disparity between the guideline
ranges and the potential statutory maximums has allowed for and
even promoted the differences that have sometimes occurred. Since
they were enacted, the statutory penalties have remained relatively
unchanged and represent the philosophical basis for punishment that
prevailed at their inception, i.e, retribution.8 4 However, with the
advent of the guidelines, the trial judge was confronted with a
markedly lower suggested sentence than was permitted by statute.
For instance, burglary is punishable by up to twenty years impris-
onment,85 yet under the most recent guidelines, the recommended
aggravated range is only twelve to eighteen months for a person with
a prior record score of zero.8 6 As a consequence, the trial judge is
often torn between these two extremes and the philosophies they
represent.
A second point to be made is that it is important to distinguish
between a complete failure to exercise discretion and a so-called
abuse of discretion. In the former case, the judge imposes an unrea-
sonable sentence and fails to state why. In the latter, the judge
imposes a harsh, or lenient, sentence and states his or her reasons,
but which fail to satisfy the appellate court. With respect to the
former, no man should be required to pay for a judge's arbitrary or
prejudicial sentencing philosophy.8 7 For example, a jurist who sen-
83. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17.
84. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
85. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. §§ 3502, 1103 (Purdon 1973).
86. 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 303.8, 303.9 (Shepard's 1988).
87. "As far as I am concerned, I would not want any human being, no
matter how sorry he might be, to pay for my mistakes with his life or liberty."
Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1976) (remarks of
Brewster, J.).
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tences all tax evaders to extensive prison time without even consid-
ering lesser alternatives, but who is relatively lenient to burglars or
robbers has clearly abused his power. I am confident that these types
of abuse are rare and are nonetheless corrected on appeal.
My quarrel is not with the concept of appellate review, but rather
with the frequency that appellate tribunals send cases back because
of a perception that the trial court "abused its discretion." The
entire record as a whole should be taken into consideration in
reviewing a sentence, not just the remarks of the trial judge. If the
judge says little or nothing with regard to rehabilitation, can he or
she be faulted if the lawyers, probation personnel or the defendants
themselves say little to show any promise. By the same token, if the
facts of the crime cry out for retribution and the record shows that
this concern was foremost in the mind of the judge such that notions
of leniency or rehabilitation were out of the picture, should the judge
still be required to say, "I have considered the defendant's prospects
for rehabilitation, but they must fall to the heinous nature of the
crime"? For that matter, requiring the trial judge to tick off the
numerous factors impinging on a sentence is often reduced to a
ritualistic litany like prayers before meals.
Appellate courts looking down on a cold record at a time and in
a place far removed from the trial court and the community within
which the crime was committed are ill-suited to determine the sub-
stantive fairness of a sentence for the same reason the law grants
broad discretion to the trial judge in ruling on the grant or denial
of additur or remittitur in a civil case. 88 A cold record does not show
the tears on a victim's cheeks nor the fear in their eyes, much as it
fails to show the apathy and rebellion in the expression of the
offender.
Surely, unwarranted disparity in sentencing is an anomaly to be
condemned in a society that so often exalts "equal protection of the
law" over the will of the majority. But to say that uniformity in
sentencing is the be-all and end-all is to say something different. In
our energetic response to sentence disparity, have we gone overboard
in our quest for uniformity, have we taken away too much discretion
from those who must decide what is fair, and as a result forgotten
that "[n]ot all rapes or all robberies are equal in damage or in




viciousness"? 9 Our sentencing guidelines include only two variables
in the equation: (1) prior criminal history; and (2) offense gravity
score.90 Yet there are an almost infinite number of variables which
enter into the formula for determining a "fair" sentence. Thus, the
guidelines can be seen as a reference point or bench mark on which
we begin our computation in a given case, but nothing more. The
trial judge, who lives and works in the community, is more sensitive
to these variables and the competing demands placed on his discre-
tion.*
89. SYMPosIUM, DISPARITY AND EQUALITY OF SENTENCES-A CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE, 40 F.R.D. 55, 73 (1965) (Remarks of Rubin).
90. 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 303.2, 303.7, 303.8 (Shepard's 1988).
* The author wishes to include mention of a very recent case which supports
the position of this article. This is a landmark case in Pennsylvania and one which
originated in Judge Dowling's courtroom.
Commonwealth v. Joseph Devers, -Pa. __, __A.2d -(July 27,
1988) 21 M.D. Appeal Docket 1987, is a truly landmark case which deals with the
precise issue of trial court sentencing discretion and the requirement of a "statement
of reasons." This case thoroughly rejects a long-standing line of superior court
decisions which had required an explicitly detailed statement by the trial judge of
the reasons for the sentence imposed. As the title of the article implies, it is the
author's position that discretion in sentencing has returned to the trial judge. Devers
emphatically makes this return full circle. One of the assertions made in this article
is that the entire record should speak for itself at sentencing and that this entire
record should be considered when analyzing the substantive fairness of any sentence.
See p. 938. Dever holds that as long as the sentencer has a presentence report, the
sentencer is presumed to have weighed the various factors and is not only held to
his/her remarks made at the time of sentencing. Further, the article attacks the
requirement that the judge tick off the statutorily mandated factors as a "ritualistic
litany like prayers before meals." See p. 938. Devers rejects this requirement stating,
"re checklists or any extended or systematic definitions of their punishment proce-
dure." slip op. at 18.
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